It is, of course, always better to have questions that can't be answered than answers which can't be questioned.
Competition between theories is not always settled by empirical investigation – as in the case of quantum mechanics, historical sciences, conspiracy theories, superstitions, and many more. Yet we are still able to make rational judgments about them; we can rationally have a preference between competing scientific theories, or between science and conspiracy, even when empirical tests can’t settle the matter. We do this by using the method of inference to the best explanation. This kind of reasoning is ubiquitous in science. Thus, empirically unanswerable questions are not inherently unscientific.And since such theories provide us with explanations of the world around us, they are also useful and interesting.
They are perhaps metascientific. They are not scientific in themselves, because science tends to concern itself with what's measurable and observable. But they are an essential part of the scientific p
... Show more...It is, of course, always better to have questions that can't be answered than answers which can't be questioned.
Competition between theories is not always settled by empirical investigation – as in the case of quantum mechanics, historical sciences, conspiracy theories, superstitions, and many more. Yet we are still able to make rational judgments about them; we can rationally have a preference between competing scientific theories, or between science and conspiracy, even when empirical tests can’t settle the matter. We do this by using the method of inference to the best explanation. This kind of reasoning is ubiquitous in science. Thus, empirically unanswerable questions are not inherently unscientific.And since such theories provide us with explanations of the world around us, they are also useful and interesting.
They are perhaps metascientific. They are not scientific in themselves, because science tends to concern itself with what's measurable and observable. But they are an essential part of the scientific process.
Consider the question discussed near the start of this article: “Could machines ever be conscious?” My friend’s cousin suggested that we can’t ever really empirically settle the answer to that question; therefore, we would be better off redefining ‘conscious’ to mean something we can actually determine empirically (such as passing the Turing Test).
Well, that would open a can of worms. A person in a coma or even just asleep isn't conscious, but they will likely become conscious again at some point. They don't degenerate into inanimate objects while their Turing Test-taking capabilities are temporarily nullified. Or better, we might say that they are in an altered state of consciousness wherein they cannot take the test.
Consider: an important reason we think it is fine to kick a rock but not to kick a puppy is that rocks don’t experience you kicking them, but we think puppies do. (Though we might still think things like, “there’s something sadistic and wrong about wanting to induce even fake pain behaviour”.)
Quite right, and puppies can't take the Turing Test either. Nor do we feel the need, in most cases, to apply any kind of test anyway. Caveats : "fake pain" can be found in essentially all kinds of fiction, but wanting to read or write content in which fictional people or animals experience suffering clearly doesn't constitute sadism. Yet I'd still find it extremely creepy if someone decided to "torture" a robot.
We can’t currently (perhaps ever) empirically test whether any other being is actually having experiences that are rendered in its own first-person perspective, or whether it merely acts like it does. That’s a version of “the problem of other minds”. That’s why it’s probably right to say that we cannot ever really empirically test for certain whether any given machine is conscious; we each can’t do so for anyone other than ourselves!(But) If our new, empirical definition doesn’t give exactly the same answers to the question “Which entities are conscious?” as the empirically undetectable definition, then we’ll either attribute suffering to things that don’t really experience it or end up ignoring real suffering. The first of those outcomes could lead to unnecessary restrictions on our actions, while the latter could lead to moral catastrophe! By itself, this is enough to show that some questions that aren’t empirically answerable matter greatly. That’s enough to show that Practical Empiricists are wrong.
I have argued that Practical Empiricism threatens to impoverish your worldview: as we have seen in the arguments above, by committing most of the tools of “inference to the best explanation” to the flames, it can cut you off from realms of fascinating explanations, make it harder to reject conspiracy theories, and potentially even lead to moral catastrophe (by leading us to misclassify which entities matter morally)!
#Philosophy
#Science
clearerthinking.org/post/in-de…
Some questions can't be settled by empirical evidence. That doesn't mean they're unscientific. See how simplicity, explanatory power, and other theoretical virtues help you judge rival theories.
Travis M. (Clearer Thinking)